Can the ICJ Advisory Opinion Transform Nepal’s Climate Governance?

By Ms. Ichhya Regmi* and Mr. Praas Guragain**

On the 3rd July 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) published its Advisory Opinion (“AO”) titled “Climate Emergency and Human Rights”, recognizing  “a standalone right to a healthy climate,” stating that causation of irreversible harm is at odds to jus cogens. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued an advisory opinion in May 2024, declaring that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions account for marine pollution under UNCLOS and trigger binding due-diligence duties for states. Adding to jurisprudential strength, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is ready to clarify the rights and obligations of states under existing international law, providing a clear legal benchmark to remove any ambiguities surrounding the country's obligations moving forward. This ruling is ought to be a “turning point” integrating a legal structure that unites human rights, environmental law and state responsibility.

Domestically, Nepal’s constitutional and legal frameworks lay the groundwork to address the issue of climate change. The 2015 Constitution guarantees every citizen “the right to live in a clean and healthy environment” and tasks the state with protecting nature. The spirit and intent of the Constitution of Nepal strongly support actions to address environmental degradation and promote sustainable practices. Moreover, the climate rights used by the litigants in the climate-related cases, including social justice-related rights and socio-economic rights, are justiciable fundamental rights guaranteed by our constitution. Nepal’s Supreme Court has been active on climate: in the landmark Padam Bahadur Shrestha v. Prime Minister (2018) case, it ruled that failing to act on climate change violated citizens’ fundamental rights (to life and health) and breached the state’s duty to safeguard the environment (clxtoolkit.com). The Court cited “intergenerational climate equity” and ordered the government to draft a comprehensive climate law covering mitigation, adaptation and future generations’ rights. In response, Nepal did pass new laws and plans. The 2019 Environment Protection Act and Forest Act now include climate provisions – for example, requiring officials to develop adaptation plans and set emissions targets. Nepal also has a 2011 Climate Change Policy and a National Adaptation Plan (2021–2050) outlining resilience measures. 

However, significant gaps remain. Nepal still lacks a dedicated, stand-alone climate law; our climate actions are scattered across various acts and policies. We believe that such a stand-alone climate statute could provide special legal protection to the vulnerable groups who need special legal protection. The victims of climate-induced disasters in Nepal are not prioritised by our political and legal system. The plans and policies that intend to protect such groups are not implemented at the ground level. Important policies – from the 2011 Climate Change Policy to the National Adaptation Plan – often lack enforcement. In practice, economic projects sometimes override the actual needs of people and the planet. For instance, in 2021, the Supreme Court blocked a budget provision that would have allowed massive sand and gravel mining in the fragile Churia hills. The Court called unchecked quarrying “ecocide” and an intergenerational injustice (climatecasechart.com), emphasising the precautionary principle. But such rulings face little follow-up. Nepal has no specialised environmental courts, and our generalist judges and bureaucracies often lack capacity or political will. Local media and NGOs note that many landmark environmental rulings remain unimplemented due to government inaction (news.mongabay.com). In short, although our constitution and courts have given strong mandates, weak enforcement and competing priorities mean that on-the-ground climate governance in Nepal is still limited.

Implications for Nepal’s Climate Governance

The ICJ advisory opinion arrives at a critical juncture. It offers the promise of international recognition for Nepal’s justice claims, affirming principles like differentiated responsibility, polluter-pays and duty to compensate. But it also comes with limits: an advisory opinion is not legally binding on states. The key question for Nepal is whether this new global moral pressure and legal clarity can be harnessed at home, or whether it will remain mostly symbolic. A central tension is between the weak state of international climate law and Nepal’s needs. Leading polluters have long argued that frameworks like the Paris Agreement already define all states’ duties. In Nepal’s view (echoed by many vulnerable nations), current commitments fall far short. Nepal’s delegates stressed that new legal norms are needed to ensure mitigation and support. 

This matter is vital for Nepal. The ICJ could confirm that states have duties under customary international law, such as the duty of due diligence, the no-harm rule, and the precautionary principle, even outside treaties like the Paris Agreement. If the decision is not in favour of states holding them liable for transboundary harm, Nepal, on the other hand, could stand on stronger legal grounds and advocate that major contributors to the climate crisis provide compensation for the rapid glacier melt in the Himalayas.

The submissions and statements from Vanuatu and the Maldives proclaim that emissions from one country contributing to the climate crisis in another shall be handled like any other form of cross-border environmental harm. In case of adoption of this perspective, Nepal would tend to have a legal basis to trail political and legal assertions for any loss and damage.

Also, the advisory opinions give clarity and a stronger position for Nepal to claim funding from the Loss and Damage Fund, as a matter of global responsibility. The diplomatic arguments can be strengthened by the advisory opinions ensuring climate justice through binding commitments.

Even a robust advisory won’t magically fix Nepal’s governance challenges. For instance, Nepal’s 2019 Environment Protection Act calls for national carbon targets and an Environment Protection Fund, but it lacks teeth on enforcement or funding. Provinces and local bodies have roles in climate and environment under the Constitution, but coordination between levels is weak. In effect, Nepal struggles to convert legal mandates into real-world outcomes.

Conclusion

The upcoming ICJ advisory opinion is a crucial test for Nepal’s climate governance. Its very existence underscores that the international community now frames climate change as a matter of justice and rights, not just policy. If the Court affirms stronger obligations on emissions reductions, financial aid and human rights protections, Nepal will gain powerful moral and legal ammunition. Such guidance would bolster our arguments in courts and at the UN. But the true turning point will depend on what we do at home. Nepal’s political leaders must translate the Court’s words into action: enacting a dedicated climate law, fully enforcing environmental regulations, and demanding climate finance from richer nations. Civil society and young people will be key in this process, using the Court’s findings to hold power accountable.

The legal system—often viewed as strict and elitist—is changing. The ICJ, ITLOS, and IACtHR show that the law can support the fight for climate justice. These advisory proceedings indicate that youth and developing countries can lead the conversation, rather than simply reacting to it. We, the youth of Nepal, must take charge of this transformation. We must demand that our government respect international standards regionally. We are obliged to hold global institutions liable for presenting climate finance as compensation, not as donations. And we essentially should remind the world that a dissolving mountain that wails, does not scream silence, it seeks justice.

We hope that this international milestone sparks real change within Nepal: a legal and political transformation where “climate justice” becomes a lived reality rather than a slogan. We want Nepal to fully embrace its constitutional promise of a clean and healthy environment – not only for us, but for our children and grandchildren. The ICJ’s voice could guide that journey, if we listen and act. Ultimately, every new law passed, every regulation enforced, and every climate-friendly policy adopted in Nepal will be a beacon proving that this was indeed a legal turning point, not just global rhetoric.

* Ms. Ichhya Regmi is a fourth-year law student of the BEc- LL.B program of Kathmandu University School of Law, Nepal.

* * Mr. Praas Guragain is a third-year law student of the BBM- LL.B program of Kathmandu University School of Law, Nepal.

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in the symposium’s blog posts are those of the author and do not represent the views of WYCJ. Furthermore, university chapters were prepared, edited, and approved by the respective universities; WYCJ cannot guarantee the level of scientific and legal inquiry, nor the content of blog posts.

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Seeking Justice Amid Climate Injustice: Analyzing Nepal’s Written Statement on Obligation of States in Respect of Climate Change

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What Global Climate Opinions Can Teach SAARC: A Comparison of ICJ, ITLOS, and IACtHR